Volume 50
Issue 2 "As if Equity Mattered" in Natural Resources
Spring 2010

Land Use Regulation: Time to Think about Fairness
Joseph L. Sax

Recommended Citation
Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think about Fairness, 50 Nat. Resources J. 455 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol50/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\50-2\NMN202.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

28-DEC-10

11:24

JOSEPH L. SAX*

Land Use Regulation: Time to Think
About Fairness
ABSTRACT
After nearly three decades struggling with the problem, the U.S. Supreme Court may finally have given up the effort to formulate clear
doctrinal lines to identify regulatory takings. The theoretical battle
appears to be over, at least for the present, with no winners. There
are definitely losers though—landowners who are victims of inequity, if not of constitutional wrongs. Why are we in this situation?
Because it is an inescapable product of the land use system we have
created. To promote unconstrained private initiative by landowners,
we allow owners to consume limited ambient resources like open
space and habitat in a version of a prior appropriation system so that
nothing is left to later-developing landowners when the limits of acceptable use are finally acknowledged through late-stage regulation.
We have thus created a system of winners and losers, burdening a
few with obligations that should in fairness have been more equitably
apportioned. We can and should do something about it as an alternative to constitutional litigation.

I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, the courts have struggled with the tension between the need for the state to regulate the use of property and
the claimed constitutional right of property owners to have continued
entitlement to previously lawful uses respected and protected.1 As
strange as it may seem in light of the importance of this so-called “regulatory takings” issue, it was not a question that the Founding Fathers
considered at all. Even though there was a good deal of government regulation even in colonial times, scholars have shown that the “takings”
clause of the U.S. Constitution was directed only to direct public expropriations of property, such as the taking of land for a fire station or a
military base.2
The reason for this gap in the Constitution’s coverage has never
been fully explained. Perhaps it was that the scope and nature of regula* James H. House & Hiram H. Hurd Professor of Law (emeritus), University of
California, Berkeley.
1. See generally ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1999).
2. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992).
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tion at the time was well-established and accepted, and the role of regulatory government was thought to be quite stable, so that while property
owners’ use rights were limited, their reasonable expectations were
rarely, if ever, disappointed. Alternatively, perhaps it was simply that
even those who wrote the Bill of Rights did not think of everything. In
any event, modern times have brought a wide range of regulatory laws
that dramatically changed the rules of the game from the owner’s perspective. These laws include urban zoning, child labor laws, minimum
wage laws, rent control, and—more recently—endangered species protection, coastal zone management, open space requirements, and the like.
Whatever the historical explanation may be, it is today nearly universally accepted that some regulatory laws, even though they do not
formally transfer ownership of property to the state, should be considered as constitutional takings requiring that the owner be paid “just compensation.” An uncontroversial example would be a law zoning a private
tract of land “for public school use only,” or requiring an owner to allow
the public to use his or her land as a park, making it available for picnics,
athletics, and other such activities.3
The result is that courts are now called upon to decide which regulations should be viewed as acceptable governmental activity—though
it makes property less useful or valuable to its owner, and which regulations should be viewed as effectively taking the property for public use
and thus must be compensated. Courts and academic writers have struggled mightily, but inconclusively, over this question.4 Would a law enacting liquor prohibition be a taking as applied to a beer manufacturer who
is left with a stock of unsellable alcoholic beverages? Is it a taking to
prohibit the continued use of property to keep pigs and chickens as the
neighborhood shifts from farming and the property finds itself in the
path of urbanization? Can the owner of a historic building be obliged to
keep it in place, though she could earn much more by demolishing it and
replacing it with a high-rise? What of the landowner whose property is
critically important habitat for a wildlife species on the verge of
extinction?
The U.S. Supreme Court has shifted one way and then the other
on these and similar questions. Towards the end of the nineteenth cen3. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 82 A.2d 34 (Pa. 1951) (city put private land in
plat of future public parks, and prohibited compensation for any private improvements
thereon).
4. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964); FRED
BOSSELMAN et al., THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING
COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS (1973). Scores, if not hundreds, of subsequent articles have
addressed the issue.
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tury, it tended to uphold government regulation and deny compensation. Then, in the period up to the New Deal, it struck down much social
legislation as expropriative of property rights. After the so-called “switch
in time” during the FDR era, the Court became more sympathetic to regulation, only to shift again starting around 1980. In recent decades, the
more conservative majority on the Supreme Court has shown that the
Court is, again, quite sympathetic to the constitutional claims of property
owners.5
As the Supreme Court has moved one way and then another, its
approach to the problem has also varied. At times it has sought to articulate relatively objective rules to govern the cases (e.g., the degree of economic loss to the owner) while at other times it has set out open-ended
standards that left a good deal of discretion to the decider (e.g., does the
law disappoint reasonable investment-backed business expectations).
Currently, the Court appears to have relented in its effort to find objective rules, and has returned to a more open-ended, soft-doctrine
approach.6
All these judicial shifts, along with the Court’s inability to find
any satisfactory constitutional approach to the problem, suggest that the
desirability of looking beyond constitutional law for an understanding of
the “regulation v. property” issue. Perhaps these matters are best understood as presenting issues of fairness, rather than formal legal rights. The
following pages are intended to re-focus thinking away from legalisms
and toward a more equity-based paradigm in approaching a problem
that has baffled and frustrated the courts.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
Regulatory takings cases in the Supreme Court began to turn up
in the late nineteenth century, as industrialization, urbanization, and
population heterogeneity grew. The Court at the time either took the position that these disputes were the inevitable consequences of those
changes, or that they were political—rather than legal—problems. The
general notion then was that one must adapt to changing times and values (prohibition,7 rent control,8 urbanization9) and learn to contend with
the fact that legislatures sometimes act imprudently. As Justice Holmes
put it with his inimitable succinctness: “[T]hat the states might be so fool5.
is Lucas
6.
7.
8.
9.

The leading precedent of the contemporary and more conservative Supreme Court
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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ish as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs for them, has no bearing on
[the regulated party’s] constitutional rights.”10 While an occasional regulatory takings case would attract the Court’s attention,11 it evinced no
interest in exploring takings law in terms of doctrinal development, saying that there were “no rigid rules” or “set formula[e]” available to tell
where regulation ended and a taking began.12
Beginning in the 1980s, something dramatic happened. Probably
stimulated first by Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in the hotly contested Penn Central historic preservation case,13 and then intensified with
the appointment of Antonin Scalia in 1986, and Clarence Thomas in 1991,
a majority of the Justices began to show a strong interest in regulatory
takings cases. The Court granted review of an unusual number of them
in the ensuing two decades. The emergence of a well-organized, legally
astute property rights movement was undoubtedly an important factor
as well. Whatever the exact explanation for this judicial history, constitutional adjudication has failed to provide clear guidance in regulatory takings cases. It is time to consider viewing these claims in terms of fairness,
rather than strict legal entitlement.
In a much-quoted statement, the Supreme Court once asked, why
is the plaintiff compelled “alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”14 The question is a good one. It is worth asking how it happens that a particular
burden happened to fall where it did, since in the most unsettling regulatory taking cases (unlike a nuisance case, for example) the plaintiff has
not sought to do anything different from what all his neighbors have
been doing. What makes the outcome in such cases seem especially perverse is that the problem the regulated party is obliged to resolve is not
one that has been created by him, but one created by his neighbors.

10. Erie R.R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921). Notably, the
much-cited Justice Holmes opinion finding a taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), is exceptional, and probably is explained by the earlier grant of a servitude
to the coal company by the landowner, as the great majority of Holmes’ regulatory taking
opinions sustain the regulation as non-compensable. See Sax, supra note 4.
11. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead N.Y, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952). There
always arise takings cases that do not involve land use and drawing the line between the
police power and expropriation, and I do not consider them here. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal
Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156 (1998); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51(1979).
12. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594; Caltex, 344 U.S. at 156.
13. Justice Scalia was appointed in 1986. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, was decided in 1978.
14. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
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I shall use as an example a situation drawn from a famous case
that arose in the Town of Tiburon, though the actual case, Agins v.
Tiburon, was more factually convoluted than my hypothetical suggests.15
Until the late 1960s this town, just north of San Francisco, remained quite
undeveloped. Over the next decade it experienced rapid development of
expensive homes on small lots, reflecting high real estate prices. As the
town’s acreage began to fill up, concern about preserving open space
mounted. The town debated whether to buy or regulate, and in 1973 decided to regulate the few remaining substantial tracts of remaining open
land. A principal tract was the landowner’s, Agins, five-acre parcel,
which was purchased in 1968. It was rezoned by the town and development on the lot was restricted to a maximum of one house per-acre, and
as little as one house on the five acres, depending on the decision in an
administrative permitting process.
In the actual Agins case, the Supreme Court viewed the case as
premature, since no particular application to build had been submitted
and denied, and, therefore, it was not yet possible to determine the economic burden Agins would have to bear. Agins’ lawyers had, no doubt,
purposely brought the case at that stage in order to ask why the cost of
newly required open space zoning should be borne solely by those who
owned the remaining open space at the time down-zoning occurred,
rather than by the whole community that would benefit from it. As a
matter of fairness, the question is a good one. I attempt to cast some light
on this question by taking an unconventional path, considering how—
rather than why—we end up with such outcomes.
III. AMBIENT RESOURCES, SPACE, AND TIME
I begin with what I call the “ambient resource” hypothesis. Open
space in a community is a sort of common amenity, like clean air, or
clean water in a river. Like those resources, it gets used up by landowners through development and use of land. While land development itself
does not physically emit anything outside its boundaries, in contrast to
15. Tiburon consists of nearly 1,700 acres. While more than 250 acres may have been
included in the one-to-five acre zoning (and I am unsure how much of that was already
developed and perhaps grandfathered), in fact, the town only ultimately acquired 48 acres
as open space, in addition to the five-acre Agins tract—a total of about 3 percent of the
land. Despite the zoning, the town did decide to acquire, rather than down-zone, to achieve
its open space. It appears that the proposed acquisition of the Agins tract broke down over
Agins’ demand for $2 million for the five acres, which he had purchased in 1968 for
$50,000. Agins’ brief said that the city issued bonds for a total of $1.25 million for all
purchases of open space in the city. Joint Appendix at ¶¶ V, VI, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 32–36 for more factual descriptions of the
Agins case.

R
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air or water discharges, its impacts, in such forms as congestion, high
density, and diminution of light and air, impact the community as a
whole. Just as air pollution at some point reaches an unacceptable level,
so does the loss of openness. A more familiar version of the issue (analogous to an Agins-type case) are the now-common height, setback, and
density limits imposed in urban areas,16 though their economic impact is
usually less severe than large-lot, open space zoning.
In each of these situations, it is appropriate to think of the problem as arising out of the perceived exhaustion of a common, and limited,
ambient resource (clean air, absence of congestion, light and air, open
space) that has effectively been appropriated by landowners putting
their land to use. If we look at the problem this way, it would seem most
fair from the outset to allocate an equal share of each of these exhaustible
resources to each acre of land; for example, to allot to each landowner a
certain amount of developmental density.17 Under such a system, someone like Agins would not be limited to one house per acre (or per five
acres) while his neighbors could build much more densely. Available
open space or density or air capacity would be equitably allocated in
advance.18
If one thinks about the issue this way (landowners appropriating
ambient resources), one’s focus shifts to land rights in terms of space;
that is, fairness would imply use rights equally distributed spatially.
From that perspective, it seems that a hypothetical open space owner is
being treated unfairly if he has not had his fair share of an ambient resource (open space) to use. This is basically the way property rights advocates perceive the problem (denial of rights in space), though they do
not talk in terms of misallocation or appropriation of ambient resources.
The other way of looking at the problem is from the perspective of
property rights in time, which is the position courts have generally
16. The classic examples are Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (height) and Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (setback).
17. Nothing would prevent them from trading such development rights among themselves, in the manner of TDRs (transferable development rights), so nothing in such a system would require uniformity of use. A version of this notion was first suggested by the
late Professor Donald Hagman, who wrote PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT (1973).
18. Notably, such allocation is sometimes achieved in the planned-unit development,
where amenities such as open space are provided to all in common areas, and the cost of
preserving such ambient resources is borne by all purchasers of residential parcels within
the development. Similarly, developer exactions for amenities like parks, open space, and
trails is another form of equitable sharing of costs and benefits. But such arrangements are
ordinarily only development-wide, and do not embrace an entire community. The use of
assessment districts to pay for preserving common benefits, such as wetlands, serves the
same purpose, but has not been politically acceptable in the main.
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taken. They say you must accommodate to the circumstances and constraints of the time when you choose to use your property, and that what
might have been permissible earlier—such as more dense development—may not now be permissible in a more urbanized or densely developed environment, or when public values change.19 From that
perspective, a landowner is not being treated unfairly in comparison to
his neighbors, since they also had to adjust to the circumstances of the
time in which they developed their land.
It is instructive to consider the exhaustion of ambient resources
from the contrasting perspectives of land rights seen through the
frameworks of space or the framework of time. Considered in terms of
space, to apply different standards (of density, for example) to neighboring properties seems a priori unfair. Considered in the framework of
time however, such differences seem reasonable since every owner had
an equal chance at any given time to use his or her land consistently with
the then-operative rules.
The different postures of time and space also suggest different reactions to the common notion that property ownership must include the
right to use it for some economically profitable purpose.20 If one’s perspective is property in space, then it seems logical to say that beneficial
use of the space must be an element of your rights. Considered in the
framework of time however, it could be argued that the owner had an
opportunity to make a profitable, or more profitable use, but unlike
others, he or she let that opportunity pass. While the choice of waiting
might pay off handsomely, it also might not.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS
To appreciate this dual way of looking at property rights, it might
help to take note of an aspect of our legal system that formally adopts

19. The classic examples are Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
20. No right is recognized to use property profitably, even where the owner is perfectly innocent. For example, no compensation is required when newly discovered knowledge shows a product to be harmful or dangerous to health. As Justice Scalia himself noted
in his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, “[T]he corporate owner of a nuclear
generating plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault” would not be entitled to compensation even though “[s]uch regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the
land’s only economically productive use. . . .” 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992). Although no
one knew it was harmful earlier, Scalia’s explanation is that the desired use “was always
unlawful” (i.e., harmful to health or safety). Id. at 1030 (emphasis in original). Such an
explanation must be little comfort to an owner whose perfectly reasonable investment has
been made worthless by a new law embodying newly discovered knowledge.
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both a space-based and a time-based system. Water is a classic example
of an ambient resource that can be used up, either in the sense that the
available supply is totally abstracted leaving a riverbed dry, or legally
limited in the amounts that may be abstracted in order to protect water
quality. To review how our water rights systems work, in the East we
generally follow the riparian system, which is space-based. In the West
we generally follow the appropriation system, which is time-based.21
The riparian system grants equivalent use rights to all landowners
whose property adjoins a river, or lake. Under classic riparian theory,
each riparian landowner has the same right to use of the river based on
its spatial identity (the size and location of its tract, regardless of the time
of its use).22 The water use right is effectively built into the land, and is
shared among all riparians. Some riparian owners, consequently, may
have to reduce their use if there is not enough left for a newly demanding riparian. Conversely, under the prior appropriation system, timing is
everything; if early appropriators take all the available water, later appropriators will be left with nothing. If existing uses have to be reduced,
the most junior appropriators will first have to yield their water use until
the new instream flow requirements are met.23 Under that system, space
means nothing and time means everything, and land ownership provides no entitlement to water.
Water law is the rare property regime where our legal system has
explicitly confronted the time and space distinction in regards to the use
of an ambient resource. It illustrates that either approach to property
21. For a detailed explanation of the two systems, see, e.g., A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (2008).
22. The dominant theory is that each riparian owner’s right is correlative. See Mason v.
Hoyle, 14 A. 786 (Conn. 1888); Half Moon Bay Land Co. v. Cowell, 160 P. 675 (Cal. 1916).
There are in practice many variations of riparianism, and in some a time-based element
comes into play, so that a later riparian who cannot show that an existing user’s use is
unreasonable may be left without a share of the water. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 855 (1979). Sometimes the doctrinal system is contractually changed, as by consents
not to sue in the case of riparianism, and arrangements for shortage-sharing in the case of
prior appropriation. Such arrangements evidence a felt need for more equitable (shared)
allocation.
23. The system can be somewhat more complex than this. While there is no doubt that
first-in-time operates in regards to private use rights, there has been a question whether,
when fish survival is threatened and existing uses must be reduced, all users (regardless of
priority) can be obliged to contribute equally or whether the burden must fall entirely on
the most junior-in-time users. See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Unlike capital developments on land, past water use can
be easily revised for the future, and if all must contribute, the preferred status of senior-intime appropriators is reduced. Also, under many arrangements where water is provided by
a water district under a large-scale program, individual users may simply have contractual
rights, and shortages may be shared pro rata.
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rights is a priori legitimate, and that a landowner may, or may not, have
a property right to some share of those resources. Under prior appropriation, if the government determines that no more water is available for
appropriation—whether to protect fish, water quality, or instream recreation, a landowner who has not previously appropriated water is simply
out of luck, regardless of the impact on the value of his land.
As a matter of strict legal theory, one may say that water is different because it has always been considered a public resource, rather than
a right embedded in land ownership—even in a riparian system.24 My
purpose here, however, is not to suggest a strict parallel, but to illustrate
alternate ways of thinking about ambient resources and to suggest that
one may appropriately consider them as embedded in landownership, or
as free-floating resources available for appropriation. Yet, as far as I
know, the legal system has not directly addressed these issues for resources other than water, with the possible exception of wildlife.25 The
ambient air is classically considered un-owned and un-ownable, but in
fact people appropriate its assimilative capacity as a waste sink for industrial emissions, and we legally determine the limits of that capacity
and regulate its use under air pollution laws.26 Conversely, we seem not
to have addressed things like density as an independent ambient resource at all, though we do regulate density development, and treat it as
an exhaustible resource that landowners utilize. The same can be said of
habitat, a resource that we recognize and regulate within the context of
laws like the Endangered Species Act (ESA),27 but that has never formally been given independent status from the acreage to which it is
constituent.
Though we do not talk about it this way, it is obvious that we
have adopted a sort of prior appropriation system for ambient resources
like density, open space, and habitat. Those who develop first in time are
generally allowed to do so with minimal limitations on the use of those
resources, while at some later time a community determines that acceptable limits have been reached, and further appropriation is limited or
prohibited. The newer landowner, or the late developer, is then left in
the same position as one who comes to appropriate water in a western

24. See Hudson Country Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
25. Laws restricting private land use to protect wildlife habitat go back at least to the
seventeenth century. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 212
(2009); see also Cawsey v. Brickey, 144 P. 938 (Wash. 1914).
26. See, for example, the law relating to new sources in non-attainment areas (where
assimilative capacity has legally been used up) under the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7501–7515 (2006).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
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state, only to find that the available supply has been fully taken by prior
appropriators.28
It would have been possible to adopt a different system, under
which these ambient resources were equally, or at least much more
equally, allocated to landowners on a space-determinative basis. That
would have called for a much greater degree of land use planning at an
early stage of development, which has distinctly not been the favored
approach in this country. There are probably several explanations; the
first is a political choice. It reflects a strong desire to leave planning initiatives to owners in the private marketplace, rather than opting for government planning.29 So the prior appropriation system I have just
described is no accident. It grows out of a deep political conviction about
how the shape of the landscape should be determined and by whom.
The result is that our land use lawmaking is basically what I would call
late-stage regulation, with restrictions coming only when the ambient resource in question is nearly exhausted,30 as illustrated by Agins-type
cases.
V. THE SYSTEM WE HAVE CREATED
However unselfconsciously, we have created a competitive system in which landowners effectively vie with each other to get the benefit of acceptable levels of density, assimilative capacity, habitat, open
space, and the like. Usually the race is to the swift, though it also can be
advantageous to wait, as land values usually rise with time and increased population. There is also always the prospect of getting one’s
project approved before restrictive regulations come into effect, especially under our late-stage system of regulation.
The reason such a system arose, as I have just suggested, was not
to foment competition and produce an array of winners and losers, but
rather to minimize governmental control of land use and to spur private

28. The government commonly builds projects to increase supplies—by building reservoirs and/or importing water from other sources—but no one thinks it is legally obliged
to do so in order to make dry land economically productive.
29. Interestingly, collective governance in the context of private planning does not face
the same constraints, as illustrated by the authority vested in condominium and planneddevelopment home owners associations through CC&Rs (Convenants, Conditions and Restrictions), private governance constitutions that are sometimes extremely restrictive. See,
e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA (1994).
30. An analogy on the international scale is the conflict between early and later industrializing societies, where the ambient resources are, for example, forest clearings for agriculture, or contributions to global warming, and the later developing nations claim an
equitable right to garner the same (environmentally destructive) benefits that earlier-developing nations took.
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initiative. The system probably works well enough for professional developers and large landowners who are sophisticated in the operation of
regulatory systems, and well-positioned to deal with risk. However, it
can be devastating for the individual who buys a lot to build a house and
is unexpectedly confronted with new restrictions that drastically reduce
its usefulness for the intended purpose.
The actual Agins case is exemplary in this regard. Not many years
earlier, a California law authorized the acquisition of private property by
local governments for open space purposes, and specifically empowered
them to use eminent domain for that purpose.31 In addition, academic
advocates for open space preservation were urging action by compensated regulation,32 and the Tiburon officials began by planning to buy the
land in question, rather than to downzone it.33 Agins bought his land in
1968.34 In 1970, California mandated an open space element as part of the
general land use planning process for local governments, and it mandated open space zoning by cities not later than 1973.35 In that year
Tiburon enacted an open space zoning ordinance, which included the
Agins land, allowing as few as one, and potentially as many as five,
houses on the five-acre tract, with such determinations based on a permitting process that considered architectural design and environmental
reviews.

31. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6950–6954 (Deering 2010).
32. Jan Z. Krasnowiecki & James C.N. Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 184 (1961), proposed a law “to regulate land use in the
manner of zoning and to guarantee the owner of affected land the value of his property in
the manner of eminent domain,” saying “[l]and-use controls which can be sustained as
noncompensable regulations under the police power are inadequate to accomplish the
broader objectives of open-space preservation.”
33. In 1972 Tiburon hired financial and planning consultants. The financial consultants
advised them to purchase 30 acres of undeveloped land, including the Agins parcel.
Tiburon subsequently acquired a number of properties by negotiation, but never purchased any of the property that the financial consultants considered. Brief of the Conservation Foundation et al. Amici Curiae as Support of Appellee, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (No. 79-602), 1980 WL 340016 at *7–8.
34. He paid $50,000 for five acres, while in his suit he sought $2 million as
compensation.
35. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 65,560–65, 65860(a), 66,451, 66,474 (Deering 2010). See also CAL.
CONST. art. XXVIII. The open space zone embraced 250 acres, some 15 percent of its land
area in the new one-to-five acres zoning. Tiburon originally planned to acquire the Agins
tract and 25 adjoining acres for open space, and eventually it purchased a total of 48 acres
on the ridge where the Agins property lay, but it abandoned its eminent domain case
against the Agins tract after Agins claimed that the rezoning was a taking of its property.
Presumably Agins wanted much more for his land than the city was able to pay.
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Some land acquisitions should surely be seen as speculative at a
certain point in time,36 and at some point it is also reasonable to require
landowners to be adaptive to changed circumstances.37 Other situations
can fairly be characterized as involving disappointment of perfectly reasonable expectations.38 Someone buying land in California in 1968 might
quite reasonably have anticipated that open space, if and when required,
would be acquired by purchase or eminent domain, not by downzoning.
Another troublesome element generated by the system of ambient
resource appropriation and late-stage zoning is that the burden often
seems to fall on the wrong people, a version of no good deed going unpunished. The endangered species situation provides the ultimate example; we wait until the species is about to become extinct, with the
predictable result that the only regulated party will be the rare owner
who has not destroyed the habitat value of his land, while everyone else
has made their land useless for that purpose through use.
This is true in an Agins-type case because open space is scarce due
to the fact that all the neighbors have destroyed it by building too
densely on their own land. Of course this is also true of even the most
conventional down-zoning cases, where urbanization generates height
and other density limitations. The root of the problem is not the specific
impact of the regulation on the owner, but the very nature of the timebased appropriation system, combined with deferred zoning. The system

36. This is the moral hazard problem. People who are assured of compensation have
an incentive to continue to invest, though knowing restrictive regulation is highly likely.
See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 520 (1986).
Surely it is time to stop compensating people who invest in biologically sensitive wetlands,
which have been restrictively and increasingly regulated since the 1960s. See, e.g., Commissioner of Natural Res. v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1965).
37. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), is illustrative, where with varying
ownerships and proposals, unsuccessful landowner efforts to obtain permission to fill a
coastal wetland had been going on since 1962, as the law governing development of such
tidal salt marsh lands became ever more restrictive.
The more general issue of regulation and adaptation is profoundly important.
Sometimes, as with auto emissions, regulation generates adaptation through technological
advances, demonstrating that necessity can indeed be the mother of invention. Sometimes,
the law allow allows adaptation over time, as with the amortization of non-conforming
uses. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.70 et seq. (3d ed. 1993).
38. The notion of reasonable expectations as a legal standard raises a circularity problem. One’s “reasonable” expectations depend on how much change in public knowledge
and values the law should require one to anticipate. If the marketplace does not accurately
account for the prospect of change, must the law respect the market’s excess optimism
(encouragement of speculative behavior)? See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d
237, 246 (Cal. 1975). And, as the above discussion of the ESA indicates, some changes are
almost impossible to predict in any specific way.
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itself assures that the social cost of dealing with issues like loss of biodiversity, open space, congestion, and the like, are not equitably apportioned among those who cause the problem—unlike a nuisance, for
example, where he who causes the problem has to fix it.
To further complicate the issue, asking taxpayers to compensate
the subjects of late-stage regulation would not bring things back into
equilibrium since those who have benefited from the system are not usually the current residents of the community. Unfortunately, those who
profited from pre-regulation development—commonly developers, who
at some earlier time appropriated more than their space-based share of
the ambient resources—are likely to be long gone. In any event, it would
truly be a fool’s errand to try to track down those responsible for today’s
problems, such as those who have plowed up the original habitat of the
grizzly bear or paved over the habitat of the coastal California gnatcatcher. With a system that encourages the appropriation of ambient resources but fails to provide a mechanism to compensate subjects of latestage regulation, what are we to do?
VI. IS THERE A ROLE FOR FAIRNESS?
As the preceding article suggests, I do not see any way in which to
undo the basic momentum and consequences of the land management
system we have created, which is essentially a competitive appropriation
system. Decades of inconclusive constitutional litigation show that its inequities cannot be systematically undone through doctrinal
development.
We need to recognize that there are instances in which regulated
property owners are unduly burdened and should, in fairness, get some
relief from the public. The experience of the Supreme Court in regulatory
takings cases demonstrates that no workable formal standards can be
articulated to identify cases of unfairness, nonetheless, one can point to
some specifics of regulation that call out for attention:
• Regulation comes later and later in the developmental process, and the number of those affected becomes ever
smaller.39
• The likelihood rises that there will be little, if any, reciprocity of burden and benefit for those regulated, as happens

39. This result is in effect a reverse example of spot zoning, where one tract is picked
out for more favorable treatment than all the surrounding property, in violation of the
standard prohibition on piecemeal zoning. See MANDELKER, supra note 37, at §§ 6.27 et seq.
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when almost all nearby property has already been developed without restrictions.40
The burden on the regulated will be great.
The benefits of regulation will inure to those whose activities have generated the need for regulation. That is, those
who have already fully developed their land, but will benefit from the imposition of restrictions on neighboring
property.
There will be little or no basis for asserting that the regulated party could or should have anticipated change and
was a conscious risk-taker.
And, in the particular case, the regulation will cause genuine hardship.

We have devices that address similar matters, notably the variance in land use law, which, though its implementation has been often
criticized,41 is specifically designed to deal with “unnecessary hardship.”42 The transferable development right (TDR)43 is another device
that can be employed to provide some mitigation below the level of constitutional just compensation, and can be useful where a desirable restriction falls on one owner, but its benefits accrue to its neighbors.44 A
more informal approach has been taken in the negotiation of some
Habitat Conservation Plans under the ESA,45 where local, state, and federal governments have made some contribution to the assembling of sufficient habitat to avoid jeopardy, supplementing the constraints agreed
to by the private landowner. Relocation payments, not required by the

40. The Solicitor General’s brief in the Agins case urged that since the property surrounding Agins’ tract was zoned the same, Agins would enjoy reciprocity of advantage
from the down-zoning. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980) (No.79-602).
41. In general, variances have been found to be too generously granted by local governments. See, e.g., Richard F. Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois,
26 U. CHI. L. REV. 509 (1959).
42. See MANDELKER, supra note 37, at §§ 6.42 et seq.
43. The TDR permits an owner who is prohibited from using some of its preexisting
developmental rights in a congested area, to take that quantum of density and add it to the
owners’ development rights on another site.
44. A TDR was granted to Penn Central in exchange for its refraining from building a
high rise above the architecturally significant Grand Central Station building. Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
45. Endangered Species Act §10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2010). For example, where additional undeveloped land is needed to protect habitat, the government supplemented
what the landowner must do by contributing land available from a closed military base; or
the government arranged with a local government to manage some of its open space land
as protected habitat, to fulfill part of the obligation the law formally places on the private
landowner.
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Constitution, were provided to owners forced to move as a result of urban renewal projects. A Missouri statute allows a condemnee to get an
extra payment of 50 percent of fair market value when property is taken
that has been in a family for more than 50 years. This payment is defined
in the statute as heritage value.46 Finally, there is a long history of statutory relief for those whose property is not taken, but who are disadvantaged by public projects, such as loss of access resulting from the laying
out or discontinuance of highways.47
VII. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, and in contrast to many other countries,
America’s reluctance to engage in long-range land use planning, and to
diminish the autonomy of landowners, has produced a situation of latestage public governance. That situation has, in some instances, thrust an
undue portion of the burden of programs like open space, coastal, and
biodiversity protection on the relatively few landowners who still have
undeveloped or pristine land available. In the interest of fairness, such
burdens should have been more widely spread among landowners in the
affected community.
The effort by owners to achieve such re-distributive fairness
through constitutional litigation has thus far proven unsatisfactory. Decades of court cases have shown that constitutional doctrine cannot provide a satisfactory solution for a problem that is too case-specific for the
doctrinal rules that the courts have used, such as percentage of economic
loss or categorization as a traditional nuisance.
The lesson of this experience suggests that we look to other models for assuring fairness to landowners, while maintaining the legitimate
and necessary authority of the state to regulate land use in accordance
with contemporary problems and present-day community values. We
have a variety of flexible but workable tools, such as the variance and the
habitat conservation plan, that provide the necessary flexibility and casespecificity that issues such as fairness require. We should begin looking
to them as an alternative to regulatory takings lawsuits.
While governments are not easily persuaded to make voluntary
payments to regulated parties, and while each of the devices mentioned

46. See State ex rel. C.F. White Family Partnership v. Roldan, 271 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Mo.
2008) (“‘Heritage value’ is defined in section 523.001.2 as the value assigned to any real
property, including but not limited to real property owned by a business enterprise with
fewer than one hundred employees, that has been owned within the same family for 50 or
more years, such value to be fifty percent of fair market value.”) Id. (bold & italics in
original).
47. See, e.g., Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 128 (Mass. 1909).
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in this article operates in the shadow of constitutional or other legal obligation, there is much to be said for seeking some new and more effective
way to deal with cases that cry out for relief in the name of fairness.

